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CHAOS IN THE COURTROOM:
CONTROLLING DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANTS AND
CONTUMACIOUS COUNSEL IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS

Michael P. Scharf
I. INTRODUCTION

The Saddam Hussein Trial will no doubt be remembered as one of
the messiest trials in legal history. During the eight-month long "Dujail"
trial (October 2005-August 2006), Saddam Hussein, his seven codefendants, and their dozen lawyers regularly disparaged the judges, interrupted witness testimony with outbursts, turned cross-examination into political diatribes, and staged frequent walk-outs and boycotts. 1 The first Presiding Judge, Rizgar Amin, was pressured to resign due to the perception
that he had lost the battle of the wills against Saddam Hussein, and the replacement judge, Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman, often shouted angrily at the defendants and repeatedly tossed them and their lawyers out of the courtroom.
The trial was the first ever to be televised gavel-to-gavel in any Middle
Eastern country, enabling the world to witness the daily scenes of chaos in
the courtroom.
I was one of the members of the team of experts assembled by the
Regime Crimes Liaison Office and the International Bar Association to train
the Iraqi High Tribunal judges. During the training sessions in the fall of
2004 and spring of 2005, we spent a great deal of time discussing a number
of ways to respond to the defendants' and defense counsel's likely disruptive antics. Needless to say, things did not go as we had hoped.
A month after the conclusion of the Dujail trial, in September 2006,
I was invited by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, to speak to his staff in The Hague about the lessons from
the Dujail Trial concerning maintaining order in the courtroom during a war
crimes trial. Drawn from my Hague lecture, this article examines some of
history's previous messy trials and the strategies judges have employed with
Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Co-author of the book, SADDAM ON TRlAL
(2006) and founder of the Grotian Moment: Saddam Hussein Trial Blog,
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial, Scharf was a member of the international team of experts
that provided training to the judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal in 2004 and 2005. The author
thanks Christine Lillie for her invaluable research assistance.
1
Christopher Allbritton, Saddam 's Trial: Behind the Scene, TIME, Feb. 13, 2006, at 5051.
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varying degrees of success to respond to disruptive conduct by trial participants. It then describes the various tactics employed by the judges in the
Dujail trial and analyzes why they were not more successful. The article
concludes with a detailed prescription for maintaining order in future war
crimes trials.
II. THE NEED FOR ORDERLY JUSTICE IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS

Disruptive conduct may be defined as any intentional conduct by
the defendant or defense counsel in the courtroom "that substantially interferes with the dignity, order and decorum of judicial proceedings."2 There
are six main types of disorder:
(1) passive disrespect, for example, the refusal to address the judge as
"Your Honor" or refusal to stand when the judge enters the courtroom;
(2) refusal to cooperate with the essential ground rules of the judicial proceedings
(e.g., constantly insisting on making political speeches instead of asking
questions
during cross-examination);
(3) a single obscenity or shout;
(4) repeated trial interruptions, ranging from insulting remarks to loud
shouting or cursing;
(5) in a televised trial, attempting to incite acts of mass violence; and
(6) resorting to physical violence in the courtroom. 3

Former leaders and their counsel in war crimes trials are especially
likely to engage in such forms of disruption. Because of the political context
and widespread publicity, leaders on trial are more likely than ordinary defendants to have concluded that they do not stand a chance of obtaining an
acquittal by playing by the judicial rules. Instead, they seek to derail the
proceedings, hoping for a negotiated solution (e.g., amnesty) outside the
courtroom; to hijack the televised proceedings, hoping to transform themselves through political speeches into martyrs in the eyes of their followers;
and to discredit the tribunal by provoking the judges into inappropriately
harsh responses which will make the process appear unfair.
As Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, observed sixty years ago, war crimes trials, whether before international tribunals or domestic courts, seek to establish a credible historic record of abuses
and elevate the rule of law over the force of might, thereby facilitating the

2

NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE

BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT
3

!d. at 91.

91 ( 1973 ).
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restoration of peace and the transition to democracy. 4 While tolerating dissent is a healthy manifestation of a democratic government, "a courtroom is
not an arena in which dissension, particularly of a disruptive nature, may
supplant, or even take precedence over, the task of administering justice."5
This is especially true in a war crimes trial.
Unlike other forms of acceptable political expression, a disruptive
defendant or defense lawyer who interferes with the "grandeur of court procedure" (as Hannah Arendt once described the judicial process) 6 threatens
the proper administration of criminal justice in several fundamental ways.
First, disruptive conduct renders it more difficult for the defendant and any
co-defendants to obtain a fair trial. Second, it hampers the court's ability to
facilitate the testimony of victims and other witnesses. Third, it undermines
the public's confidence in and respect for the legal process.
There are those who would argue that a defendant has a right,
through his own (or through his lawyer's) disruptive and obstructionist conduct, to an unfair trial, but modem war crimes tribunals have held that the
defendant's right to employ disruptive tactics which seek to discredit the
judicial process must give way to the tribunal's obligation to protect "the
integrity of the proceedings" and "to ensure that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute." 7 The duty of a war crimes tribunal to
ensure that a trial is fair has been interpreted as inCluding concerns that go
beyond just those of the accused.

ll. HISTORY'S MOST TUMULTUOUS TRlALS
A.

From the Chicago Seven to Zacarias Moussaoui

The administration of justice has always endured a degree of disorder and there have been many notable occasions when trial participants have
been particularly unruly and disrespectful to judicial authority. A list of
history's most disruptive defendants would include Sir Walter Raleigh (tried
in Britain for high treason in 1603), William Penn (tried in Britain for
4

Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President, June 7, 1945, quoted in MlCHAEL P.
SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 37 (1997) ("We must establish incredible events by credible evidence."); see also Robert H. Jackson, Opening Speech for the Prosecution at Nuremberg,
Nov. 21, 1945 quoted in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MrLITARYTRmUNALNUREMBERG, Vol. II 98-99 (1946).
5
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Aams, J.,eoncurring and
dissenting).
6

Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in Is LAW DEAD? 212 (Eugene V. Rostow ed.,
1971).
7

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga
Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, ~ 28 (Jan. 17, 2005).
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unlawful assembly in 1670), Auguste Vaillant (tried in France for blowing
up the Chamber of Deputies in 1894), Michele Angiolillo (tried in Spain for
assassinating the Spanish premier in 1897), and Gaetano Bresci (tried in
Italy for killing Italian King Humbert in 1899). 8 But by far the most notorious disorderly trial in modem history was the Chicago Seven conspiracy
trial of 1969-1970.
The Chicago Seven trial is particularly relevant to the Saddam Hussein trial because Hussein's chief American Lawyer, former U.S. Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, had also been an advisor to the defense team in that
notorious trial three decades earlier. In the Chicago Seven case, the leaders
of the anti-Vietnam war movement-Bobby Seale, David Dellinger, Abbie
Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Lee Weiner, and John
Froines-were charged with conspiring, organizing, and inciting riots during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. 9 The trial drew
considerable public notice because of the defendants' notoriety and their
courtroom antics.
On the first day of the trial, when the presiding judge, Julius Hoffman, refused to issue a postponement so that Bobby Seale's attorney would
have time to recover from a gall bladder operation, 10 Seale said to the judge,
"If I am consistently denied this right of legal defense counsel of my choice
who is effective by the judge of this Court, then I can only see the judge as a
blatant racist of the United States Court." 11 This brought a strong rebuke
from Judge Hoffman. 12 That same day, Judge Hoffman reprimanded Tom
Hayden for giving a clenched fist salute to the jury and Abbie Hoffman for
blowing kisses at the jurors. 13 A few days later, the defendants tried to drape
the counsel table with a North Vietnamese flag in celebration of Vietnam
Moratorium Day, drawing another round of sharp words from the judge. 14
Throughout the trial, the defendants refused to rise at the beginning
or close of court sessions. 15 On two occasions, defendants Abbie Hoffman
and Jerry Rubin wore judicial robes in court onto which were pinned a Jewish yellow star, meant to imply that Judge Hoffman was running his courtroom like the courts of Nazi Germany. 16 The defendants frequently called
8

Dorsen, supra note 2, at 24-32.
Although there were initially eight defendants, Bobby Seale was severed from the case
before it went to the jury.
10
See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 358 (7th Cir. 1972).
11
Id. at 374.
12
Id.
9

13
See Pnina Lahav, Th~ater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 16
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 381, 387 (2004).
14
See id.
15
461 F.2d at 382, 386.
16
Lahav, supra note 13, at 430.
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Judge Hoffman derogatory names, accused him of racism and prejudice,
and made sarcastic comments to him, such as asking "How is your war
stock doing?" The most serious disorder occurred two weeks into the trial,
when Judge Hoffman learned that a few minutes before the commencement
of the court session, Bobby Seale had addressed the audience of his supporters in the courtroom, telling them that if he were attacked "they know
what to do." 17 Judge Hoffman responded by having Seale bound and
gagged. Defense counsel William Kunstler then scolded the Court, saying
"This is no longer a court of order, your Honor; this is a medieval torture
chamber. It is a disgrace." 18
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Hoffman issued a total of 159
citations to the defendants and their lawyers for contempt in response to
these incidents of disruption and disrespect. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the contempt convictions on the ground that the
judge cannot wait until the end of the trial to punish the defendants and their
lawyers for misconduct. It also reversed the convictions on the substantive
charges, in part due to the prejudicial remarks and actions of the trial judge
and inflammatory statements by the prosecutor during the trial. 19 It should
come as no surprise that the Chicago Seven trial is universally seen as a low
point in American courtroom management. Rather than viewing Judge
Hoffman as a brave hero fighting anarchy, history remembers him more as
an accomplice who unwittingly fanned the flames of disorder. Slobodan
Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, both of whom were advised by Ramsey
Clark, set out to do the same thing to the judges ofthe International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Iraqi High Tribunal.
Just a few months after the Chicago Seven trial, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Illinois v. Allen that an unruly defendant could be excluded
from the courtroom during his trial if his disruptive behavior threatened to
make orderly and proper proceedings difficult or wholly impossible?0 Allen
had been tried in a state court in 1957 for armed robbery of a tavern owner.
During his trial, Allan threatened the judge's life, made abusive remarks to
the court and announced that under no circumstances would he allow his
trial to proceed. The court responded by removing him from the courtroom,
after appropriate warning, and Allen was convicted in his absence.
The Supreme Court affirmed Allen's conviction, ruling that removal after a warning was permissible and far less objectionable than use of
17
18
19

!d.
!d.

United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dillinger, 472
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
20
Ill"mo1s
. v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Court explained that it was "essential to the
proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmark of
all court proceedings in our country." Jd. at 343.
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restraints. In a passage that was obviously inspired by the publicity surrounding the Chicago Seven t1ial, the Supreme Court stated:
Trying a defendant for a crime while he sits bound and gagged before the
judges and jury would to an extent comply with that part of the Sixth
Amendment's purposes that accords the defendant an opportunity to confront the witnesses at the trial. But even to contemplate such a technique,
much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while
shackled and gagged except as a last resort. Not only is it possible that the
sight of shackles and gags lnight have a significant effect on the jury's
feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings
that the judge is seeking to uphold? 1

Yet the Court declined to rule that physical restraints may never be used,
saying: "However, in some situations which we need not attempt to foresee,
binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way
to handle a defendant who acted as Allen did here. " 22
The first major chaotic trial to arise after the Supreme Court's Allen
decision was that of Charles Manson who, along with three women members of his cult, was tried from June 1970 to March 1971 for the gruesome
murder of movie actress Sharon Tate and five others. During the trial, Manson constantly interrupted proceedings by shouting, chanting, turning his
back on the judge, assuming a crucifixion pose, and singing (actions often
parroted by the three women co-defendants). 23 The court responded by repeatedly having the defendants removed from the courtroom. In one instance, the judge removed Manson after he leaped over the defense table to
attack the judge with a pencil, shouting "In the name of Christian justice,
someone should cut your head off. " 24
More recently, in February 2006, accused al-Qaeda terrorist
Zacarias Moussaoui, was thrown out of the courtroom by U.S. District
Judge Leonie Brinkema, and then temporarily banned from returning to
court, due to his disruptive and belligerent outbursts. "This trial is a circus .
. . God curse you and America," Moussaoui shouted a! the judge as he was
led away. "You are the biggest enemy of yourself," Judge Brinkema replied,
ordering that Moussaoui watch the remainder of the proceedings via closed-

21

!d. at 344.

22

Id.

23

Robert Dardenne, The Case of Charles Manson, in THE PRESS ON TRIAL 159, 167 (Lloyd
Chiasson Jr. ed. 1991).
24

Id.
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circuit feed from a jail cell inside the courthouse. Media outlets reported
25
that most legal scholars agreed that Judge Brinkema acted appropriately.

B.

Disorder in The Hague

Slobodan Milosevic was the first forn1er head of state to be tried in
an international war crimes trial. Although assisted by an army of defense
counsel including Ramsey Clerk, Milosevic asserted his right to act as his
own lawyer in the televised proceedings before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, as
this would enable him to make lengthy opening and closing statements and
turn cross-examinations into oppmiunities for unfettered political diatribes.
As the trial unfolded, Milosevic exploited his right of self-representation to
treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and the judges in a manner that would earn
ordinary defense counsel expulsion from the comiroom. He often strayed
from the forensic case into long vitriolic speeches and he was frequently
strategically disruptive. 26
On numerous occasions, the presiding judge, Richard May, tried to
reign in Milosevic with little success. A defendant who is represented by a
lawyer is ordinarily able to address the court only when he takes the stand to
give testimony during the defense's case-in-chief. And in the usual case, the
defendant is limited to giving evidence that is relevant to the charges, and
he is subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. While a judge can
control an unruly lawyer by threatening fines, jail time, suspension, or disbarment, there is little a judge can do to effectively regulate a disruptive
defendant who is acting as his own counsel.
While Milosevic's antics did not win him points with the judges,
they had a significant impact on public opinion back home in Serbia. Rather
than discredit his nationalistic policies, the tJ.ial had the opposite effect. His
approval rating in Serbia doubled during the first weeks of the trial, and two
years into the tJ.ial he easily won a seat in the Serb parliament in a nation25
MicHAEL P. SCHARF, Did the Dujail Trial Meet International Standards ofDue Process,
in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI H:IGH TRIBUNAL 162, 163
(Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, eds. 2006); see generally Neil A. Lewis, Judge
Ejects 9/11 Suspect After Outburst, N.Y. TllviES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A20; Kelli Arena & Kevin
Bohn, Al Qaeda Conspirator Barred from Court, CNN.com, Feb. 14, 2006,
1ttp://www.cnn.com/200G/LAW/02/14/moussaoui.trial/index.html/.
26
For references by the Tribunal ofMilosevic misusing hearings and cross examinations
.sa platform for making political speeches, see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54', Initial Appearance (July 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Status
:onference, (Oct. 30, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session,
\fov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Hearing, (Nov. 10, 2004);
rosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T Pre-Defense Conference, (June 17, 2004); see
'so Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct
"Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 823, 832
005).

.,
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wide election. In addition, opinion polls indicated that a majority of Serbs
felt that he was not getting a fair trial, and that he was not actually guilty of
any war crimes. 27 Suspicion surrmmding the circumstances of Milosevic's
death just before the conclusion of his trial has only reinforced these widely
held views.
Six months after Milosevic's death, another Serb leader, Vojislav
Seselj, decided that he, too, would utilize the right of self-representation as a
means of dismpting his trial before the ICTY. Seselj made his unruly intentions clear on the eve of trial when he published three books in Serbia entitled Genocidal Israeli Diplomat Them·dor Meron (about the President of the
ICTY), In the Jaws of the Whore Del Ponte (about the Chief Prosecutor of
the Tribunal), and The Lying Hague Homosexual, Geoffrey Nice (about the
lead trial prosecutor). 28 Seselj tried repeatedly to provoke the judges at pretrial hearings and made numerous obscene and improper statements in his
pre-trial motions, including one submission which stated, "You, all you
members of The Hague Tribunal Registry, can only accept to suck my
cock."29
On the eve of trial in August 2006, the Trial Chamber revoked Seselj 's right to self-representation.
While it is clear that the conduct of the Accused brings into question his
willingness to follow the "ground rules" of the proceedings and to respect
the decorum of the Court, more fundamentally, in the Chamber's view,
this behaviour compromises the dignity of the tribunal and jeopardizes the
30
very foundations upon which its proper functioning is based.

The Appeals Chamber agreed that the Trial Chamber could revoke the right
to self-representation where the Trial Chamber found "that appropriate circumstances, rising to the level of substantial and persistent obstruction to
the proper and expeditious conduct of the trial exist."31 The Appeals Chamber, however, held that the Trial Chamber had to first give the defendant an
explicit warning. The Trial Chamber subsequently did so, and in light of
Seselj 's continuing dismptive behavior, appointed counsel over his objection to represent him for the trial.

27
Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International
Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3, 6
(2005).
28
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, ~ 30
(Aug. 21, 2006).
29
ld. ~ 48.
30 I d. ~ 77.
31

Prosecutor v. Seslj, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel, IT-03-67-AR73.3, Oct. 20, 2006, at para. 21.
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Disarray in the Dujail Trial

On August 11, 2005, the democratically elected Iraqi National Assembly adopted the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal with some modifications. Notably, the Assembly replaced the clause providing for a right of
self-representation with a clause that said that all defendants before the Tribunal had to be represented by Iraqi Cqunsel, who could be assisted by foreign lawyers. 32 During the training sessions, I strongly advocated for such
an amendment in order to ensure that Saddarn Hussein would not be able to
use self-representation as a means of hijacking and disrupting the IHT.
What I did not comprehend at the time, however, was that this legislative
change would not accomplish the goal if the judges decided to follow the
unique Iraqi legal tradition of permitting a defendant to cross-examine each
witness after his lawyer had done so.33
During the Dujail trial, Saddam Hussein and the other defendants
were constantly disruptive and prone to political theater. Hussein's disruptive conduct often coincided with the most emotionally compelling testimony of victims. He engaged in frequent angry outbursts. He yelled at the
judge to "go to hell" and called the judge a homosexual, a dog, and a whoremonger. He made wild accusations of mistreatment by his American jailers.
He insisted on prayer breaks in the middle of witness testimony, went on
hunger strikes, and repeatedly refused to attend trial sessions. Most troubling, he took advantage of the Iraqi legal tradition that permits the defendant to cross-examine each witness after his lawyer has finished his crossexamination by making frequent political speeches and impelling his followers-who were watching the television broadcasts of the proceedingsto kill American occupiers and Iraqi government collaborators.
Meanwhile, Hussein's co-defendant, Barzan al-Tikriti, who served
as head of the Internal Security Agency, competed with Hussein for the
most offensive insults directed at the bench. On one occasion, he appeared

32

Qanoon Al-Mahkamat Al-Jeena'eyyat Al-Eraqiyyat Al-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi
High Tribunal] art. 19(d), Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf (Iraq), reproduced in MICHAEL P. ScHARF &
GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM ON 'TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH
T~BUNAL 283 (2006); English Translation of the Iraqi High Tribunal Rules of Procedure and

EVJdence (2005), Rule 29, id. at 313.
33

.

. ~ere Js also some international tribunal precedent for the approach of the IHT. After
assJgrung counsel over the accused's objection, the ICTY permitted the accused Krajisnic "as
an ex~ception to the usual regime, to supplement counsel's cross-examination with his own
~uestwns." Prosecutor v. Krajisnic, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajisnik's
_equest to Proceed Unrepresented by Counsel, Case No. IT-00-39-T, 18 August 2005, para.
3
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in court wearing only his pajamas,34 and another time, he insisted on sitting
on the courtroom floor with his back to the judge. 35
For their part, Saddam Hussein's retained lawyers, in particular
Lebanese defense attorney Bushra al-Khalil and Jordanian lawyer Salah alAnnouti, frequently made outrageous political speeches and acted in outright contempt of the Iraqi High Tribunal. They engaged in tactics such as
insulting Judge Ra'ouf, holding up photos of U.S. prison abuses at Abu
Ghraib,36 and on one occasion pulling off their defense counsel robes and
hurling them at the bench. 37 Saddam Hussein's retained lawyers also staged
a walk-out in the middle of a trial session and boycotted the majority of the
trial sessions including the closing arguments. 38 These acts violated Iraqi
law and the Iraqi Code of Legal Professional Ethics, which provide that
lawyers practicing in Iraqi courts must be respectful toward the court, must
appear in court on the set dates, should not try to delay the resolution of a
case, and must facilitate the task of the judge. 39
The flrst presiding judge, Rizgar Arnin, attempted to deal with such
disruptive behavior by ignoring it. 40 Although human rights groups applauded Judge Rizgar's calm demeanor in conducting the the trial, the Iraqi
population felt that he was losing the "battle of the wills" against the former
dictator, and he resigned under the weight of mass public criticism. 41 The
new presiding judge, Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman, employed a number of tactics
to regain control ofhis courtroom. 42
34
Edward Wong, The Reach of War: The Trial; Hussein, Gleeful, Badgers the Judge and
Declares a Hunger Strike Over His Treatment, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2006, at A10.
35
Robert F. Worth, Prosecutors ofHussein Press Charges of Execution, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
14, 2006, at A8.
36
Edward Wong, Saddam Admits He Swiftly Doomed 148 Villagers, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
April2006.
37
Hussan M. Fatah, For a Shiite, Defending Hussein is a Labor ofLove, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2006, at A4.
38
See Nehal Bhuta, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
71 (Human Rights Watch, 2006) (discussing the role of Defense Office lawyers after privately-retained defense counsel began boycotting the Dujail trial in February of2006).
39
Law of the Legal Profession, No. 173 of 1965, art. 50; Lawyer's Professional Code of
Conduct, June 16, 1987 (annexed to the Law of the Legal Profession), art. 9, cited in Bhuta,
supra note 38, at 70.
40
See Michael Scharf, Who Won the Battle of Wills in the December Proceedings of the
Saddam Trial?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 129, 130 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, 2006).
41
See Michael Scharf, A Changing of the Guard at the Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM
ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 136, 136-37 (Michael
P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, 2006).
42
See Michael Scharf, The Battle of the Wills-Part Two, in SADDAM ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 143, 143-44 (Michael P. Scharf
& Gregory S. McNeal, 2006).
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Judge Ra'oufbegan his first day as presiding judge by sternly warning defendants and counsel that outbursts and insults would not be tolerated.
A few minutes later, he demonstrated his resolve by evicting defendant Barzan al-Tikriti and defense counsel Bushra al-Khalil when they failed to heed
to his admonishment. When the retained defense counsel responded by boycotting the trial en masse, Judge Ra'ouf appointed public defenders toreplace them. Notably, when the retained defense counsel later asked to return, Judge Ra'oufpermitted them to do so. He never imposed fines or other
sanctions on them for their misbehavior, despite the fact that they resorted
to such tactics again and again throughout the trial. Nor did he revoke the
defendants' right to question the witnesses or to address the court, despite
the fact that it was frequently abused.

Ill. REMEDIES FOR DISRUPTION
A.

Limiting Self-Representation

Permitting a former leader to assert the right of self-representation
in a war crimes trial is a virtual license for abuse. There is no customary
international law right to self-representation, and many countries of the
world require that defendants be represented by counsel in all cases involving serious charges. 43 The Iraqi National Assembly was prudent to require
that defendants before the Iraqi High Tribunal be represented by Iraqi lead
counsel, who the Tribunal could control through various sanctions available
under Iraqi law.
It was a huge mistake, however, for the presiding judges of the Iraqi
High Tribunal to allow the defendants to question witnesses following their
lawyers' cross-examinations, as this completely undermined the objective of
the National Assembly's revisions to the lliT Statute. Instead, the judges
should have recognized that departures from traditional Iraqi practices are
warranted in an extraordinary trial of this nature, especially as the traditional practice was neither required by Iraqi nor international law.
In the United States, courts have held that a defendant who is represented by a lawyer has no right to act as co-counsel by, for example, crossexamining witnesses or addressing the bench. The rule limiting the defendant's participation is necessary "to maintain order, prevent unnecessary
consumption of time or other undue delay, to maintain the dignity and decorum of the court and to accomplish a variety of other ends essential to the
due administration of justice. " 44
Even in a tribunal such as the ICTY, whose statute provides for the
right of self-representation, the Appeals Chamber decision in the Seselj case
43
44

Scharf & Rassi, supra note 27, at 13-15 (2005).
United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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recognizes that such a right is a qualified one. Abuse it and you lose it.45
Drawing from international tribunal precedent, defense counsel should be
imposed on a defendant who seeks to represent himself where: (1) the de~
fendant attempts to boycott his trial; 46 (2) the defendant's self-representation
would prejudice the fair trial rights of co~defendants; 47 (3) the defendant is
being persistently disruptive or obstructionist; 48 or (4) self~representation
would unreasonably prolong the trial. 49
Since most war crimes tribunal courtrooms are partitioned by
sound-proof glass, a judge may effectively deal with minor disruptions by
simply turning off the defendant's microphone. In the case of persistent
disruptions, the judge must give a specific warning before revoking the right
of self-representation. In addition, the defendant must be accorded at least a
chance to reclaim the right if he manifests a willingness to conduct himself
consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts
and judicial proceedings.

B.

Standby Public Defenders

Whether in a situation where a defendant is representing himself, or
where he is represented by retained counsel, a war crimes tribunal must
have standby counsel ready to step in when needed. 5° Such occasions would
include situations where the defendant or his counsel engage in persistently
disruptive or obstructionist behavior, or where they stage a walk-out or a
boycott of the proceedings
Just as a war crimes tribunal should appoint at least one alternate
judge who observes the trial from its commencement in case one of the
judges should need to be replaced for health or other reasons, so too should
45

See Prosecutor v. Seslj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel,~ 21 (Oct. 20, 2006).
46
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-07-19-T Decision on Defense Counsel
Motion to Withdraw, ~ 24 (Nov. 2, 2000); see also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458
(1912) (holding that a trial could continue where the defendant refused to appear in the courtroom . . . to hold otherwise would enable the defendant to "paralyze the proceedings of
courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce").
47
Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-4-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the
Special Court,~ 14 (Jan. 17, 2005).
48
Prosecutor v. Seslj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel,~ 21 (Oct. 20, 2006).
49
Prosecutor v. Mi1osevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel,~ 17 (Nov. 1, 2004).
50
The concept of standby counsel refers to an attorney who is appointed to assist a selfrepresented defendant. Daniel Klein, Annotation, Right, under Federal Constitution, of accused to represent himself or herself in criminal proceeding--Supreme Court cases, 145
L.Ed. 2d 1177 (2004).
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standby public defenders be present from the beginning of the trial. Such
counsel should be highly qualified, receive the same international training
as prosecutors and judges, and be assisted by international experts. The very
presence of standby public defenders can have a deterrent effect on misconduct by a self-represented defendant or by retained defense counsel because
they will recognize that their disruptive actions will not successfully derail
the trial, which can proceed without pause with standby counsel.
Ironically, the Iraqi High Tribunal did, in fact, appoint standby public defenders, but failed to provide timely notice to the media of their appointment, to describe their credentials, or to explain their function. Consequently, several print and broadcast media outlets erroneously reported that
Saddam Hussein was not represented by any counsel during those periods in
which his retained counsel were boycotting the proceedings. Similarly, human rights organizations, which were publicly critical of the skills and experience of the public defenders, failed to recognize that they were, in fact,
being assisted by international experts obtained and paid by the International Bar Association. 51
C.

Expulsion and Other Sanctions

The ICTY Appeals Chamber indicated in the Milosevic case that the
principle of proportionality must always be taken into account in crafting an
appropriate response to disruption or delay. 52 With this admonition in mind,
a war crimes tribunal should deal with the six categories of defendant misconduct identified above as follows:
First, passive disrespect should generally be ignored unless it substantially
interferes with the proceedings. The essential dignity and decorum of a
courtroom does not turn on whether the defendant stands or addresses the
judge as "Your Honor."
Second, a judge should inquire as to why a defendant is refusing to cooperate with the fundamental ground rules of court proceedings. Often such
behavior is in response to perceived unfair decisions by the bench. 53 The
defendant should be assured that his rights will be protected, and warned
that he faces exclusion from the courtroom or other appropriate and proportional actions.

51

See Eric Blindennan, Judging Human Rights Watch, 39 CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L.
(2007).
52

See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, ~~ 17-18
(Nov. I, 2004).
53

.
In the case of the Saddam Hussein trial, this perception was in part caused by the
Judge_s' ,ill-conceived decision to defer pronouncement of most pre-trial motions until after
the trial s conclusion.
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Third, a single obscenity or outburst should be met with a warning that
continued disruptions of this kind will lead to sanctions, including expulsion from the courtroom.
Fourth, repeated interruptions of a trial may be dealt with by expulsion after appropriate warnings have been given. Where the defendant is excluded from his trial the court should make reasonable efforts to enable
him to keep apprised of the progress of the trial and to communicate with
his attorney.
Fifth, since a televised trial gives the defendant the opportunity to communicate directly with the population at large, the judge must be particularly
vigilant not to permit the defendant to use the courtroom as a stage to incite mass violence. 54
Sixth, physical violence in the courtroom cannot be tolerated and a court
may deal with it by immediate expulsion or use of physical restraints.

Following the first incident of disruption, the judge should issue a
warning, explicitly describing the sanction that will be imposed if the disruptive conduct continues. The warning should explain that the defendant's
conduct is disruptive and will not be tolerated. It should also alert the defendant that future occurrences will result in expulsion from the trial for as
long as his disruptive posture is maintained and that the trial will continue in
his absence. The warning should explain that in addition to exclusion, the
judge may impose other sanctions on the defendant, such as relocating him
to a smaller cell, decreasing the time he gets for recreation, or reducing his
access to other prisoners and family.
While the judicial process may well proceed more smoothly without
the defendant in the courtroom, his absence may diminish the educative
function of the trial. During Saddam Hussein's boycott of the Dujail triai,
for example, print and broadcast media attention quickly dwindled, denying
the public a chance to learn about some of the most important documents
and testimony admitted into evidence. Thus, there are good reasons to avoid
the sanction of expulsion if possible. Consequently, if disruptive conduct
persists despite the initial warning, the judge should issue a firmer warning,
recess to discuss the matter with the defendant and his lawyer, or briefly
adjourn the proceedings to allow for a cooling-off period. Further disruption
should result in temporary exclusion, followed by a calibrated response proportionate to the degree and persistence of disruption.

54

Most war crimes tribunals have employed a twenty-minute delay in the broadcast of the
trial proceedings to enable them to edit out such dangerous outbursts, but the judge should
firmly communicate that such statements will be met with the sanction of exclusion. In the
Dujail trial, the judge reportedly told Saddam Hussein it was one thing to encourage supporters to kill Americans, but it was utterly unacceptable for him to encourage the killing of
Iraqis.
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Responding to Contumacious Counsel

With respect to disorderly defense counsel, the judge should clearly
set the ground rules of the trial from the beginning, warning that disruptive
conduct will not be tolerated and describing the sanctions that will be imposed in response to such transgression. Although the demeanor and conduct of counsel that is deemed acceptable may vary somewhat from country
to country, most of the world's legal professions follow the basic principle
that a lawyer must be "respectful, comieous and above-board in his relations with a judge" before whom he appears. 55 Especially in a major war
crimes trial, deferential comiroom behavior is necessary to ensure that the
judge's decisions are not perceived to be based on emotional reactions to
insult.
Following the lead of the Special Comi for Sierra Leone, all war
crimes tribunals should adopt a Code ofProfessional Conduct, which spells
out the rules of comiroom decorum applicable to both the prosecution and
defense counsel. Consistent with such a code, after an approp1iate warning,
persistent insults and disrespectful comments should be met with sanctions,
including fines, jail time, suspension, and even disbarment. Because a judge
has inherent power to remove a disruptive defendant from the comiroom, he
also possesses the inherent power to deal with a disruptive lawyer in the
same way and to temporarily or permanently replace him with standby
counsel.
It is important in this regard to stress that the obligations of a defense counsel are not just to his client, but also to the court and to the larger
interests of justice that the court is serving. Defense counsel are not merely
agents of their client, permitted and perhaps even obliged to do for the accused everything he would do for himself were he trying his own case. As
the American Bar Association has explained, "[i]t would be difficult to
imagine anything which would more gravely demean the advocate or undermine the integrity of our system of justice than the idea that a defense
lawyer should be simply a conduit for his client's desires." 56 If a client insists on his attorney asking improper questions, making irrelevant speeches,
insulting the bench, or staging walk-outs or boycotts, the lawyer must reject
those instructions, for he cannot excuse his own professional misconduct on
the ground that his client demanded it.
Moreover, the defense counsel should seek to dissuade his client
~om in1proper comiroom behavior, including explaining to him the sanehans that may be imposed by the judge and the probable prejudice to his
case if he disrupts the proceedings. A defense counsel who encourages
55
56

E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-36 (1980).

(AB STAN?ARDS RELATING TOT~ P~OSECU'~'ION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 146
A ProJect on Standards for Crumnal Justice, 1971).
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courtroom misconduct may be punished under the rules that establish his
own responsibility for maintaining courtroom decorum. If he advises a client to act disruptively (or suggests methods for doing so), the court has authority to discipline counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION: FAIR TRIAL VERSUS INTEREST OF JUSTICE
Revoking the right of self-representation, replacing retained counsel
with standby public defenders, or expelling the defendant or defense lawyer
from the courtroom may initiate a number of practical difficulties. After the
revocation of Slobodan Milosevic's right of self-representation, for example, the defendant refused to cooperate with the assigned counsel, and witnesses for the defendant refused to appear in court or to answer questions
until the defendant's control of his case was restored. 57 Similarly, Saddam
Hussein not only refused to cooperate with the public defenders during the
boycott of his retained counsel, but he attempted (without success) to prevent the public defenders from delivering a closing argument on his behalf.58
Such a situation obviously impacts negatively on the defendant's
fair trial rights, but the international tribunals have interpreted the duty to
ensure that a trial is fair to include concerns that go beyond just those of the
defendant. The narrow fair trial rights of the defendant must be considered
in the context of broader interests of justice which require "that the trial
proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or disruptions."59

57
See generally Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session (Nov. 10,
2004) (submissions by the prosecution, referring to the accused being implicated in refusal of
witnesses to testify).
58
See Blinderman, supra note 51.
59
Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defense,~ 21 (May 9, 2003).

